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DEMOCRATIC DUE PROCESS: ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AFTER BISHOP V. WOOD
A policeman is fired; a teacher is denied tenure; a prisoner is transfer-
red into solitary confinement; a student is suspended from school; a welfare
recipient's payments are cut off; a driver has his license revoked. In each
case the claim is made that the administrative action was taken without
observance of proper procedure, and a court is petitioned for relief. In June
of 1976, the Supreme Court decided Bishop v. Wood,1 a case which
portends an entirely new judicial approach to these situations. The effect of
Bishop may be to reduce substantially the quantum and quality of proce-
dures which administrative agencies must observe before taking actions
which significantly affect the status of a recipient of government largess.2
The courts have traditionally drawn on three sources in establishing
standards of administrative procedure. The due process clause, 3 general
administrative procedure statutes, 4 and statutes establishing specific agen-
cies5 have all been used to determine the procedural rights which attach to
public benefits.6 Since 1970, the judicial trend has been to utilize the due
process clause as the most important source of administrative procedural
rights.7 Courts have found the recipients of government largess entitled to
such procedural protections as notice and hearing even when those protec-
tions were not required by any relevant statute; they have viewed the due
process clause as the source of an independent constitutional mandate for
such safeguards. This phenomenon has been called the "due process explo-
sion,''8 and it recently prompted Chief Judge Friendly to ask "whether
1. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
2. "Largess" is a term used to designate the full panoply of benefits, contracts, licenses,
services and jobs which government provides without being obligated to do so. See generally
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See text accompanying note 54 infra.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-06, 1305, 3344,
6362, 7562 (1967); CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 11370-11445, 11500-11528 (West 1966); MODEL STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, reprinted in 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 134-61 (Cum.
Supp. 1967).
5. See, e.g., Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151, 153, 155-56 (West 1926).
6. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 8.01 (3d ed. 1972).
7. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,572-76 (1974); Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). The
trend began with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-66 (1970).
8. Friendly, Some Kind of Heaing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975).
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government can do anything to a citizen without affording him 'some kind
of hearing.' "9
This Comment advances the view that with Bishop v. Wood and
several related recent decisions, 10 the Court has effectively eliminated the
due process clause as an independent source of administrative procedure.
Statutory law, in the form of general procedure acts and specific agency-
related statutes, has become the solitary source of procedural protection for
recipients of public largess. If an administrative agency wishes to fire an
employee, terminate a welfare benefit, or revoke a license, it may do so with
impunity provided only that it follows the procedures (however minimal)
that are prescribed by the governing statutes. No additional requirements
will be imposed by the Constitution. As a concomitant to this development,
the responsibility for defining, shaping and limiting administrative due
process has been taken from the courts and given to the legislatures. By
placing this responsibility in the hands of elected representatives, the Sup-
reme Court has in effect created a "democratic due process clause."
Because Bishop and the antecedent cases from which it evolved1' are
all concerned with public employment, it is tempting to conclude that the
Court has announced a topically narrow doctrine which will be confined to
that context and which will be given little effect across the broader spectrum
of administrative law. It will be contended here, however, that the logic and
policy behind the Bishop decision apply to other agency actions just as
strongly as they apply to employment.
After setting forth the precedential basis for Bishop and analyzing the
dimensions of its holding, this Comment will examine the Court's democra-
tic due process approach in light of several basic principles of constitutional
law. Democratic due process will be linked to the long-standing but recently
repudiated right-privilege doctrine, and the history of that doctrine will be
critically reevaluated in the context of the Bishop decision. Finally, the
theory will be tested against the equal protection clause and the doctrine of
separation of powers. It will be proposed that democratic due process is
inconsistent with conventional interpretations of both of those constitutional
limitations.
I. DEMOCRATIC DuE PROCESS EXPLAINED
A. From Roth to Bishop: The Development of the Doctrine
Carl Bishop was fired from his post as a policeman in the city of
9. Id. at 1275.
10. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976);
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See notes 56-77 infra and accompanying text.
11. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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Marion, North Carolina without being afforded a hearing to determine the
sufficiency of the cause for his discharge. He brought suit against the police
chief and city manager under section 1983,12 claiming that he was constitu-
tionally entitled to a pretermination hearing.1 3 The federal district court
found that under the law of North Carolina and the applicable city ordi-
nances, Bishop held his job "at the will and pleasure of the city." 14 The
Supreme Court accepted this interpretation of local law, 15 and ruled that
because Bishop was not granted the right to a hearing by the relevant state
statutes and local ordinances, he was entitled to no procedural protection
under the due process clause of the Constitution. 16
Bishop represents the culmination of a lengthy process of doctrinal
evolution. To understand fully the analysis utilized in the decision, it is
necessary to trace the process back through three cases: Arnett v. Ken-
nedy , 17 Perry v. Sindermann,'8 and Board of Regents v. Roth. 19
Prior to the companion cases of Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v.
Sindermann, due process claims were treated with what has been called a
"unitary analysis." 20 The cases assumed that the recipient of a government
benefit was entitled to some kind of due process before the benefit could be
taken away; the issue was simply "how much process was due." 21 Resolu-
tion of the issue depended on an assessment of the importance or "weight"
of the interest being deprived, measured against the "weight" of the
government's interest in efficient administration. 2 For example, when a
welfare recipient claimed that his benefits could not be stopped without a
pretermination hearing, the Court balanced the importance of the welfare
payments to the individual against the importance to the government of
swifter, less burdensome procedure. 23 A ruling in favor of the individual had
the effect of invalidating the procedures established by statute as constitu-
tionally deficient. On the other hand, results favoring the government
interests established the constitutional validity of the statutory procedures.
Under this unitary due process analysis, the judiciary exerted primary and
independent control in defining the scope of the fourteenth amendment's
procedural requirements.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
13. Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
14. Id. at 504.
15. 426 U.S. 341, 345-47 (1976).
16. Id. at 347.
17. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
18. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
19. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
20. Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due Process,
1975 Sup. Cr. REv. 261, 261-62.
21. Id.




Roth and Sindermann altered this approach by eliminating the assump-
tion that some degree of procedural protection is always due. 24 Justice
Stewart, writing for the Court in both cases, introduced the notion that there
are some interests in government largess to which the due process clause
simply does not apply.25 The analysis began with the text of the fourteenth
amendment, which commands that no state shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 26 According to its
literal terms, Justice Stewart asserted, the due process clause is activated
only if a person's life, liberty, or property is at stake. 27 Extreme definitional
pressure was therefore put on the two words "liberty" and "property";
before a litigant can even argue the equities of his due process claim, he
must demonstrate that he is being deprived of one of those interests. In
developing its definition of property, the Roth Court made what in retro-
spect would prove to be the most important statement in the case:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it ....
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law.28
Virtually all of the Court's significant administrative due process decisions
subsequent to Roth have been based on the words in this passage. 29 It
contains two discrete judgments: first, a property interest is not an abstract
expectation of a benefit, but a legitimately claimed entitlement; and second,
in determining whether an asserted interest is a mere expectation or a
matured entitlement, the Court will look not to the Constitution, but to an
independent source of law, such as a state statute.
The importance of these two principles is well illustrated by the facts of
Roth and Sindermann themselves. Both cases involved professors whose
teaching contracts were not renewed by their respective state universities.
24. See generally Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Em-
ployees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 977 (1976).
25. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
27. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571.
28. Id. at 577. The gloss which this passage has taken on subsequent to Roth has ignored
the qualifying phrase "such as" and has treated the entitlement doctrine as if an entitlement can
come only from a statute, a written contract, or an implied agreement such as the de facto
tenure program involved in Sindermann. See, e.g., Connealy v. Walsh, 412 F. Supp. 146, 159
(W.D. Mo. 1976).
29. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 n.7 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
572-73 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151 (1974).
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Each claimed that the decision not to rehire was made without proper
procedure. Sindermann succeeded in his due process claim, but Roth failed.
Roth, the Court held, did not possess a property interest in continued
employment. 30 He was not a tenured faculty member, and state law explicit-
ly provided that a decision not to renew his teaching contract could be made
without explanation, review or appeal. 31 Thus, the Court said, Roth had
only an abstract, subjective expectation of future employment with the
university; the state had granted him no "entitlement.' '32 Sindermann, on
the other hand, was able to argue successfully that an entitlement based on
state law did exist in his case, by virtue of a long-standing "de facto tenure"
program at his university.33
Under the traditional unitary analysis, these two cases would have been
decided identically. Justice Stewart's two-tiered approach, however, called
for the establishment of an entitlement before any weighing of interests
could take place. Because Roth and Sindermann were subject to different
academic tenure laws, their cases produced opposite results.
Two years after Roth, the Court laid the groundwork for last term's
radical expansion of the entitlement doctrine with its decision in Arnett v.
Kennedy. 34 That case involved the dismissal, without a pretermination
hearing, of a nonprobationary federal civil service employee by the same
superior whom the employee had publicly accused of illegal conduct. 35
Notwithstanding the maxim that "no man is to be judge in his own case,'"36
the Supreme Court upheld the procedures that led to the dismissal.
Drawing on the entitlement requirement announced in Roth, Justice
Rehnquist's plurality opinion37 produced a theory which obviated constitu-
30. 408 U.S. at 578.
31. Id. at 566-67.
32. Id. at 578.
33. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 599-603.
34. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
35. Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee in the competitive Civil Service, who
worked in the Chicago office of the Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO). He had publicly
charged his superior, Wendell Verduin, with attempting to bribe a community action organiza-
tion with $100,000 of OEO funds. Verduin promptly brought charges against Kennedy, and, in
his capacity as regional director of the OEO, also upheld those charges in the form of a written
"Notification of Proposed Adverse Action". Kennedy was instructed that he could respond to
the charges orally and in writing, and that he could submit supporting affidavits at the appeal.
His reply and supporting evidence, however, were to be submitted to and evaluated by
Verduin. Understandably, Kennedy did not wish to proceed before Verduin, who was already
the victim of the alleged slander and the prosecutor of the charges. He sued for injunctive and
declaratory relief, asserting that he could not be removed without a trial-type hearing before an
impartial hearing officer.
36. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("[N]o man can be a judge in his own case
and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.").
37. There was no majority opinion in Arnett. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart
joined in the opinion of Justice Rehnquist which announced the judgment of the Court. Justices
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tional analysis entirely. In effect, the Court held that a public employee is
entitled only to those procedural protections which are expressly granted by
the relevant statutes. In its view, this holding was compelled by the
language in Roth which stated that property interests are created and "their
dimensions defined" by state law.98 It is not enough, the argument goes,
simply to find an entitlement; the dimensions of that entitlement must also
be examined. 39 If, for example, a driver's license has expired, one can
hardly assert that he is being deprived of a property interest if the license is
taken away. An expired license is worth nothing. The dimensions of the
entitlement to the license are set by the expiration dates which accompany it,
and the license to drive cannot be accepted without also accepting the
limitations on its face. In addition to expiring on a certain date, the license
may also be terminated by the occurrence of a certain event, such as an
arrest for driving more than twenty miles per hour over the speed limit. The
state has effectively provided two expiration dates, one fixed by the calendar
and another contingent on the occurrence of a specific event. If either
contingency comes to pass, the license expires and any property interest in it
no longer exists.40
The same underlying principles are readily extended to public employ-
ment. If a person is hired by a state to fill a short-term vacancy and is told in
writing that his job will expire at the end of six months, the dimensions of
his property interest are fixed by the dates set forth by the state. 41 A person
who accepts the position must also accept the six-month limitation. When
the six months have passed, his property interest will have lapsed. As in the
case of the driver's license, the state may provide an additional "expiration
date" for the employee's position: it may permit his termination on the
happening of a specified event, such as a determination by his superior that
the employee's work is unsatisfactory. The enumeration of these critical
events and the procedures to be followed when they occur are left to the
state. It may require a finding of misconduct by an impartial judge at a
trial-type hearing, or it may allow termination on the mere subjective
determination of a superior, without notice, hearing, explanation or appeal.
Powell, Blackmun and White all concurred in part and dissented in part. Justices Marshall,
Brennan and Douglas dissented.
38. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 151 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at
577), set forth in text accompanying note 28 supra.
39. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 152.
40. This analysis cannot be reconciled with Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), in which
the Supreme Court held that a driver's license could not be revoked without providing proce-
dures that comport with minimum standards of constitutional due process. Justice Rehnquist's
Arnett approach, if adhered to, requires overruling of Bell v. Burson. See Freund, Supreme
Court, 1973 Term-Forward: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REv. 13, 88 n.38 (1974).
41. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College
Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Whatever event is selected, the result is the same. Once the event occurs,
and the statutorily prescribed procedures (if any) are carried out, the proper-
ty interest is extinguished and no further "process" is "due" the affected
party.42
Thus, the essence of the analytic model propounded by the Arnett
plurality is that "[w]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed
in determining that right a litigant . . .must take the bitter with the
sweet." 43 When Kennedy accepted his job he agreed to take the bitter-the
abbreviated procedures for its termination-with the sweet-the enjoyment
of his job until it was terminated. 44 Once those procedures were followed,
Kennedy's property interest in his job ceased to exist, and he therefore had
nothing left to support a claim under the due process clause. If the Rehnquist
theory is extended to its natural limits, it will be virtually impossible to find
constitutional deficiencies in a statutory procedure for the termination of a
publicly conferred benefit. 45 For once that procedure is followed, the prop-
42. This conceptualization is analogous to the fee simple determinable interest in real
property. Just as a grantor may retain the power to take back what he has granted upon the
happening of a designated event, government may create property interests subject to defea-
sance after certain procedures have been followed. One accepts the conditions for defeasance
when he accepts the property interest; the two are inseparable. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. at 152; Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89,
109 n.81.
43. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 153-54.
44. The Arnett Court was defining the dimensions of the right to public employment under
the removal provision of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970):
Here appellee did have a statutory expectancy that he not be removed other than
for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of [the] service." But the very section
of the statute which granted him that right, a right which had previously existed only
by virtue of administrative regulation, expressly provided also for the procedure by
which "cause" was to be determined, and expressly omitted the procedural guaran-
tees which appellee insists are mandated by the Constitution. Only by bifurcating the
very sentence of the Act of Congress which conferred upon appellee the right not to
be removed save for cause could it be said that he had an expectancy of that
substantive right without the procedural limitations which Congress attached to it.
416 U.S. at 151-52.
45. At least two commentators have found the Rehnquist approach in Arnett to be the
logical corollary of Roth, stating that once the Roth entitlement doctrine is accepted, Arnett
inexorably follows. Tushnet, supra note 20, at 264; Freund, supra note 40, at 87. Professor
Tushnet therefore argues that the only way to undo Arnett is to undo Roth and eliminate the
entitlement doctrine. As a practical matter, however, few of the Justices appear willing to
abandon Roth's entitlement requirement. The closest thing to an attack on Roth itself is the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Bishop, where he states that "[t]here is certainly a
federal dimension to the definition of 'property' in the Federal Constitution .. "426 U.S. at
353. He stresses that the plain language of Roth says no more than the entitlements "can arise
from 'existing rules or understandings' that derive from 'an independent source such as state
law.' " Id. (emphasis in original). The balance of the Brennan dissent mounts a frontal assault
on the entitlement theory, substituting in its stead a more subjective inquiry into what the
employee could reasonably believe about his chances for continued employment. Id. Although
the dissent does not literally repudiate Roth, it is difficult to see how Justice Brennan's
statement that "property" has a "federal dimension" can mean anything other than a "con-
stitutional dimension." Yet there is no ambiguity in Roth's declaration that "[p]roperty inter-
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erty interest evaporates, and the fourteenth amendment is defined away into
irrelevance. 46
At the time Arnett was decided, only two other Justices shared Justice
Rehnquist's restrictive reading of the due process clause. 47 But barely two
years later, in Bishop v. Wood, 48 Justice Rehnquist's analysis commanded
the support of a majority of the Court.
In his opinion for the Bishop Court, Justice Stevens began by reiterat-
ing the notion from Roth that a property interest in employment can be
created by ordinance or implied contract. 49 He then followed the approach
taken by Justice Rehnquist in Arnett and focused on the city ordinance50 to
determine the "dimensions" of the property interest which Bishop had in
his job as a police officer. Deferring to the district court's interpretation of
ests. . . are not created by the Constitution." 408 U.S. at 577. Thus, the most direct judicial
attack on the "democratic due process" approach did precisely what Professor Tushnet said it
must: reject the entitlement theory of Roth and Sindermann.
The issue which this Comment will attempt to resolve is whether there is logical ground for
an intermediate position. Assuming the entitlement theory is retained, is there a basis for
leaving the delineation of what the due process clause requires in the hands of the federal courts
instead of delegating that task to the plenary control of the states? In effect, this will be an
effort to find support for the position espoused by Justice White (a position which Professor
Tushnet assails as contradictory, Tushnet, supra note 20, at 263). Justice White maintains that
"[t]he fact that the origins of the property right are with the States makes no difference for the
nature of the procedures required." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 185 (White, J., concurring).
As he further states, "While the State may define what is and what is not property, once having
defined those rights the Constitution defines due process . . . ." Id.
46. Once the theory of Justice Rehnquist is accepted, the due process clause loses most of
its force and is reduced to little more than a requirement that the states observe whatever
procedures they have actually set. See Comment, supra note 42, at 94 n.25. This renders the
clause superfluous, however, for courts may require states to observe their own laws without
invoking the due process clause; state laws are enforceable in their own right.
47. Six justices in Arnett specifically rejected the Rehnquist approach. See 416 U.S. at
166-67 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 185 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 211 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell, who joined in rejecting the approach in his Arnett opinion, em-
braced the Rehnquist theory in writing for the four dissenters in Goss v. Lopez, 416 U.S. 565,
584 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); see note 85 infra and accompanying text and note 90 infra.
48. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
49. Id. at 344.
50. Article II, § 6 of the Personnel Ordinance of the City of Marion read as follows:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a period of
time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what he must do if his
work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee fails to perform work up to the
standard of the classification held, or continues to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit to
perform his duties, he may be dismissed by the City Manager. Any discharged
employee shall be given written notice of his discharge setting forth the effective date
and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such a notice.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 344 n.5. The Court drew support for its reliance on state law from
a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court, Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403
(1971), which it characterized as holding that an "enforceable expectation of continued public
employment" can be found only where the state has expressly conferred such a guarantee,
either by statute or by contract. 426 U.S. at 345. The basic facts of Bishop are set forth in the
text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
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local law, the Court found that "the ordinance may . . be construed as
granting no right to continued employment but [as] merely conditioning an
employee's removal on compliance with certain specified procedures." 51
Since the procedures which the city had written were "found not to have
been violated," the Court concluded that the "petitioner's discharge did not
deprive him of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. '52
For the purposes of termination procedure, Bishop puts the govern-
mental employer in roughly the same position as a private employer. A
private employer is constrained only by the employment contract; the
governmental employer is constrained only by the statute defining the public
employment relation, which serves as the functional equivalent of a con-
tract. A private employee who sues because his job was terminated without
proper notice, explanation or hearing must rely on breach of contract to
sustain his cause of action. After Bishop, a public employee who believes
he was wrongfully fired may still bring his claim under the rubric of the due
process clause. But unless the state has breached the procedural-rules which
it itself has written, the employee will lose.53
Government largess, of course, takes many forms besides public em-
ployment. It includes Social Security benefits, unemployment compensa-
tion, public housing, veterans' benefits, welfare, government contracts,
licenses, franchises, subsidies and government services.54 The truly sig-
nificant question posed by Bishop is whether the democratic due process
analysis will be extended to cover the wide range of benefits and services
administered by public agencies. Before that question can be answered,
however, it is necessary to explore the other avenue by which a recipient of
public largess can invoke the due process clause-the claim that he has been
deprived of a liberty interest. Since Roth and Sindermann, litigants have
routinely claimed deprivation of both property and liberty interests when
51. 426 U.S. at 345.
52. Id. at 347.
53. Strategically, after Bishop, it will almost always be counter-productive for a dismissed
state employee to make his claim in federal court under the due process clause and section 1983,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The federal court's role is now purely mechanical; it is to determine
what procedures are required by looking to state court interpretation of state law. No meaning-
ful appeal is available, for under established federal practice, appellate courts defer to district
court interpretations of ambiguous state law. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346
(1976); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87 (1949); Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell,
326 U.S. 620, 629-30 (1946).
State courts, on the other hand, will be free to interpret the statute or ordinance as they see
fit. As a result, a state employee suing for breach of his employment contract in state court will
be able to invoke a much broader range of arguments than he could under a due process claim in
federal court. Balancing of the state's interest in efficiency against the need for employee
protection will be perfectly appropriate for a state court attempting to construe an ambiguous
law in light of public policy.
54. See generally Reich, supra note 2.
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bringing suit under the due process clause. 5 Bishop would be of little
import if it could be sidestepped merely by characterizing one's claim as a
deprivation of "liberty." In fact, however, this avenue of escape has
already been sealed off; the Court is quite clearly prepared to extend its
democratic due process analysis to liberty interests as well.
B. The New Liberty
What began in Roth, Sindermann and Arnett as a theory for defining
the concept of property has evolved into a device for bifurcating the concept
of liberty. Several cases decided during the October 1975 term56 indicate
that two kinds of liberty now exist-liberty which is created by the Constitu-
tion and liberty which is created by state law. 57 Liberty which has its genesis
in state law is subject to the same analysis which the Bishop Court has
applied to state-created property interests.
The first case in which the Court equated analysis of property interests
with analysis of liberty interests was Paul v. Davis.58 Davis brought suit
against the Louisville, Kentucky police chief under section 1983, claiming
that the police chief's circulation of a flyer which listed him as an "active"
shoplifter5 9 deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law.
The Paul opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, follows a line of analysis
strikingly similar to that which would appear three months later in Bishop.
55. See, e.g., Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976); Shore v. Howard, 414 F.
Supp. 379 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Connealy v. Walsh, 412 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Turano v.
Board of Educ., 411 F. Supp. 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
56. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976);
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
57. At least since the appearance of Charles Reich's germinal article The New Property,
Reich, supra note 2, it has been popular sport to bifurcate the concept of "property" according
to the origin of the interest at stake. Roughly put, the new property is that which owes its
existence to government; old property is that which comes from somewhere else. As the word
"property" connotes "ownership" and "rights," the concept "new property" has come to
stand for the notion that the judiciary should recognize rights to procedural protection in forms
of government largess. The idea reached its apex in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8(1970): "It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a
'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall
within traditional common-law concepts of property."
Bishop is in many ways a renunciation of the new property concept. It declares that the
Constitution will not be read so as to transmute public benefits into private property interests.
As the heading of this section implies, the Court has worked a double irony on Professor
Reich's efforts. Not only has it refused to extend protection to the property interests which
Reich described, it has also withdrawn protection from interests in liberty which had been
thought secure.
58. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
59. Davis had been arrested on a shoplifting charge 17 months before the flyer was
circulated. He had been arraigned and had entered a plea of not guilty, and soon thereafter the
charge was "filed away with leave to reinstate." At the time the flyer was issued, therefore, he
had not been found either guilty or innocent of shoplifting. Shortly after the flyer appeared, a
local judge dismissed the charge. Id. at 695-96.
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The Court first acknowledged that there are a "variety of interests . . .
comprehended within the meaning of either 'liberty' or 'property' as meant
in the due process clause.'"'6 The question whether the law of Kentucky
granted such an interest in one's reputation was resolved with the bald
assertion (unsupported by discussion of state statutes or judicial precedents),
that Kentucky law conferred no "legal guarantee of present enjoyment of
reputation which has been altered as a result of [the police chief's] ac-
tions. "61 Since no liberty interest expressly recognized by state law had
been infringed, Justice Rehnquist found no claim cognizable under the due
process clause.62
Reading Bishop in conjunction with Paul produces a devastating effect
on due process claims based on reputation. Paul requires that the reputation-
al interest be connected with some more tangible property interest, and
Bishop assures that such a property interest will almost never be found to
exist.63
60. Id. at 710.
61. Id. at 711-12. The Court might have found reputation to be of constitutional dimension,
of course, and therefore not subject to the throes of entitlement analysis. A ruling that
reputation is a constitutionally protected interest would not have been without precedent. See
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-74
(1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 898-99 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
By far the most important case faced by Justice Rehnquist was Wisconsin v. Constantineau, in
which the Court stated:
The only issue present here is whether the label or characterization given a person by
"posting," though a mark of serious illness to some, is to others such a stigma or
badge of disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to
be heard. We agree with the District Court that the private interest is such that those
requirements of procedural due process must be met.
400 U.S. at 436 (emphasis supplied). The Court went on to say, "[C]ertainly where the State
attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play." Id. at 437. Justice
Rehnquist, somehow finding this language "ambiguous," 424 U.S. at 707, observed that when
read against the backdrop of earlier precedents, Constantineau stands only for the proposition
that reputation is protected when coupled with injury to some other more tangible interest, such
as loss of employment. Id. at 708-10.
62. 424 U.S. at 712. In one lower court decision which has construed this aspect of Paul,
the Tenth Circuit held that an appointee to a state museum commission could be summarily
removed by the Governor with impunity. The court read Paul to require that "the governmental
action complained of must deprive the petitioner of a right which has its genesis in state law,
and the protective shield of § 1983 extends only to those interests .... Mitchell v. King, 537
F.2d 385, 390 (10th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original). Finding that the state law in question gave
the governor an unrestricted power of removal, the court held that no state-created property or
liberty interest existed. Id.
63. Justice Stevens would apparently not acquiesce in the combination of liberty and
property interests. In Codd v. Velger, 97 S. Ct. 882 (1977), Justice Stevens interpreted Bishop
as leaving the door open for liberty interest claims resulting from discharge for detrimental
remarks made in a personnel record of previously held public employment. He states "[t]he
discharge itself is part of the deprivation of liberty against which the employee is entitled to
defend," id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is clear from his dissent in Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976), that he rejects the democratic due process approach when applied to
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In two other cases from the 1975 term, Meachum v. Fano64 and
Montanye v. Haymes;65 the Supreme Court again applied democratic due
process analysis to liberty interests. Both involved prisoners who were
moved from low security to maximum security institutions where living
conditions were "substantially less favorable." 6 6 Each prisoner claimed a
due process right to a pre-transfer hearing. In each case, the court examined
state law to determine whether the prisoner had a state-created liberty
interest in remaining at the more comfortable, less restrictive prison. 67
Finding that no such interest had been conferred, the Court held that the
prisoners' claims were not actionable under the due process clause. 68
Whatever may be said of the Court's treatment of property interests, its
analysis of liberty interests within the democratic due process framework is
objectionable on several grounds. To begin with, it is beyond dispute that
certain liberty interests exist which have absolutely nothing to do with state
law. The Court in Paul gives apparently grudging recognition to this idea by
acknowledging in a footnote that "there are other interests protected not by
virtue of their recognition by the law of a particular state, but because they
are guaranteed in one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.'"69 However,
the Court's admission that some aspects of liberty derive from the Bill of
Rights only serves to illuminate a more fundamental problem with the Paul
opinion. Paul is predicated on the notion that liberty interests other than
those enumerated in the Bill of Rights are utterly outside the protection of
the due process clause except to the extent that they are "recognized...
by state law.''70 It must therefore be read as assuming that all liberty
interests not expressly protected by the Bill of Rights were surrendered to
the states, to be granted back to the people a parcel at a time as the states
deem fit.71
This analysis is incompatible with the numerous historical and judicial
precedents which assert that non-enumerated liberties are not surrendered to
the states.72 These precedents are premised on two different theoretical
liberty. See note 77 infra and accompanying text. It is not at all clear, however, that Justice
Stevens has succeeded in reconciling his Bishop opinion with Meachum; the attempt to do so in
Codd simply exacerbates the confusion. Justice Stevens' point in Codd-that a hearing is
required both to determine "what happened" and "what disciplinary action is appropriate"
would seem to require a result in Bishop exactly opposite of that which occurred.
64. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
65. 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
66. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 217 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 238
(1976).
67. 427 U.S. at 223-29; 427 U.S. at 243.
68. 427 U.S. at 229; 427 U.S. at 243.
69. 424 U.S. at 710 n.5 (1976).
70. Id. at 710-11.
71. Cf. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 327-28
(1976).
72. The Federalists opposed adoption of the Bill of Rights on the ground, among others,
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constructs. One theory asserts that certain rights exist which are outside the
Bill of Rights but nonetheless beyond the reach of government; 73 the other
holds that those rights are actually grounded in the Bill of Rights despite the
lack of direct textual support for them.74 Whether one adopts the former, the
"natural law" theory, or the latter, the "penumbral" theory, the result is
the same: there are liberties which have full constitutional status despite
their non-enumeration. 75
Most disturbing of all, however, is the basic assumption in Paul,
Meachum and Montanye that a man's liberty exists at the grace of the
state-that unless positive law grants him a specific aspect of liberty, it does
not exist. 76 It is this fundamental misconception of the nature of liberty
that because it would be impossible to list all rights, it would be dangerous to list only some
since that would imply that those not listed had been surrendered. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84
(A. Hamilton). Even James Madison thought that the Federalists' point was "one of the most
plausible arguments . . . against the admission of a bill of rights .... " I ANNALS OF CONG.
439 (1789). He specifically addressed the issue when he introduced the proposed bill of rights to
the House of Representatives, id., explaining that he had attempted to guard against such a
construction by inserting what eventually became the ninth amendment-"The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) (citations omitted):
Although the Articles of Confederation provided that "the people of each State
shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State," that right finds no
explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right
so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of
the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel through-
out the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution.
74. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965): "Specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance."
75. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the existence of many of these rights.
Among them are the right to a proportionally equal vote, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942); the right to travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to use contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); the right to obtain an abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); the right to
possess "obscene" material in one's own home, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and a
limited right of access to the courts to obtain a divorce, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971).
76. This notion goes well beyond the language of Roth, from which the entitlement theory
came. Roth did not include "liberty" within the range of interests that are created and defined
by state law. In fact, Roth gave the concept of liberty much more deferential treatment, stating
that "[ifn a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of liberty
must be broad indeed." 408 U.S. at 572. The idea that liberty depends on state-enacted positive
law for its existence is antithetical to the Roth Court's definition of liberty, as characterized by
its quotation from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 I_-S. 390, 399 (1923):
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.
As this passage demonstrates, the narrow treatment which Justice Rehnquist lends to liberty
interests in his Paul opinion is drastically different from the tenor of the opinion in Roth.
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which prompted Justice Stevens, who fully accepted the democratic due
process analysis when applied to property, to dissent from its application to
liberty:
If a man were a creature of the state, the analysis would be correct.
But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the
liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitu-
tional provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to
infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The relevant state laws either
create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of the citizen who
must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is essential to the
exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society. But
it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source.77
Despite Justice Stevens' protestations, a majority of the Court appears fully
prepared to apply democratic due process theory to liberty and property
interests without differentiation. The next inquiry, then, is whether the
Justices will truncate due process protections in a wide variety of adminis-
trative actions involving government largess.
C. The Prospects for Expansion
It would be premature to infer from Bishop, Paul and Meachun a
broad condemnation of "interest balancing" and a conclusive statement of
the dominance of democratic due process. Although Bishop seems clearly
to be the last word on public employment, 78 it is far from certain that the
Court will move to extend the democratic due process approach to such
areas as student and prisoner discipline, termination of welfare payments or
license revocation. 79 The indications from the October 1975 term are that
the Court simply has not committed itself irrevocably to either "balancing"
or democratic due process "defining." The democratic due process theory
was embraced by four dissenting Justices in Goss v. Lopez,80 a student
discipline case, but it is not known whether Justice Stevens, who provided
the decisive fifth vote in Bishop, would also apply it in the public school
77. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. See City of Chicago v. Confederation of Police, 427 U.S. 902 (1976), a due process case
involving transfer and demotion of Chicago policemen which the Court vacated and remanded
for reconsideration in light of Montanye, Meachum and Bishop. The Seventh Circuit had found
that the police officers did possess a Roth "entitlement," which gave them a right to constitu-
tionally adequate procedures before they could be transferred or demoted. 529 F.2d 89 (7th Cir.
1976). Given the fact that the actions taken against the officers were carried out in accordance
with procedures spelled out in Illinois statutes and police regulations, id. at 90 n.2, 91, the
Supreme Court's remand would appear to indicate that at least in the area of public employ-
ment, procedures prescribed by statute or ordinance will not be held deficient.
79. Recent lower court decisions have continued to employ the balancing approach. See,
e.g., Basel v. Knebel, 551 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (food stamps); Hathaway v. Mathews, 546
F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976) (medicaid payments).
80. 419 U.S. at 586-87 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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context. Meachum and Montanye extended the democratic due process
method to prison transfer cases, yet the traditional balancing theory was
used in Mathews v. Eldridge,s l which involved termination of Social
Security payments. 82 There is no principled way to reconcile Bishop with
Eldridge.83 It will not do to say that Social Security benefits are more
important in the Court's estimation than continuing employment, for if the
democratic due process concept is utilized, judicial estimations of "import-
ance" are not relevant at all. 84 Eldridge must therefore be taken as an index
of the Court's current indecision about how best to analyze the bewildering
array of due process problems in this area.
85
It must be noted, however, that the policy underlying the democratic
due process theory is possessed of an inherent expansiveness that is not
easily limited to public employment. 86 The final paragraph in Bishop echoes
a familiar theme of the Burger Court: the federal judiciary is not the
81. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
82. Eldridge, decided prior to Bishop, held that a recipient of Social Security payments has
no right to a pretermination hearing. The adequacy of the administrative procedures at issue
was determined by balancing the private interests of the recipients, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation through use of procedures already in force, and the government's interest in
avoiding the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedures would entail. See id.
at 332-35.
83. It is true that Bishop involved state administration while Eldridge was concerned with
administrative procedure at the federal level and that the Court does play a different role when
it reviews procedures undertaken pursuant to federal statutory authority. When dealing with
federal law, the Court has the power to construe a statute (or regulations promulgated pursuant
to it), and in the process of so doing, it may impose additional procedural requirements on
sub-constitutional grounds, purely as a matter of statutory construction. This is roughly analo-
gous to the supervisory function performed by the Court in the area of federal criminal and civil
procedure. Furthermore, considerations of federalism, as distinct from simple deference to the
democratic choice of the legislature, are not present in a case such as Eldridge. The Court does
not mention any of these factors, however, and there is little likelihood that they can account
for the inconsistency between Eldridge and cases such as Bishop, Meachum and Montanye.
84. Eldridge does reveal, however, how the Court can reach the same result as it did in
Bishop-both cases held existing procedure to be adequate-without making the drastic analy-
tic leap undertaken in Bishop. Instead of discarding the weighing process entirely, the Court
can achieve its ends by simply "tinkering with the weights."
85. Just as vividly emphasized is the indecision of Justice Powell. Justice Powell explictly
rejected the democratic due process approach in his Arnett opinion, only to embrace it in his
dissent in Goss. He joined the Court's opinions in Bishop, Paul, Meachum and Montanye, only
to apply the traditional balancing approach in Eldridge. It should be noted, however, that one
unifying thread runs through all of his decisions: in no case did Justice Powell hold the statutory
procedures consitutionally inadequate. Whether by way of democratic due process or balanc-
ing, Justice Powell consistently ruled against increased procedural protection for the recipient
of largess. It is fair to treat Eldridge as an effort by Justice Powell to minimize the precedential
importance of cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) and Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971). Justice Powell makes a particular point of treating the trial-type hearing requirement
of Goldberg as an aberration from a line of cases in which a full dress hearing was not required.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340, 344-46 (1976).
86. See text accompanying notes 130-36 infra for t more detailed discussion of the policy
judgments underlying democratic due process theory.
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appropriate place to resolve the countless disputes which arise in the "day-
to-day administration of our affairs."87 States should be free to set adminis-
trative standards and procedures for distributing government largess that are
consonant with the values which the people in those states attach to those
interests.8 8 The federal courts should not dictate the relative importance to
be assigned interests in various types of government benefits, nor can they
meaningfully supervise the management of largess once these initial value
judgments have been made.89
If the motivations underlying Bishop are strong enough to warrant its
expansion, the actual rationale of the decision would seem absolutely to
require it. There is nothing in the notion of a state-created interest which
warrants its confinement to one variety of public benefit. If the states have
the power to demarcate the limits of a property interest in government
employment, they must also have that power for all other property interests
in public largess. Strictly adhered to, democratic due process leaves no
room for balancing of any kind.90 Since the Court has not yet opened up
87. 426 U.S. at 350.
88. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976), where the Court emphasized the
importance of leaving the individual states the flexibility which it deemed essential to effective
prison administration.
89. A broad range of cases reflecting a movement towards greater deference to state
decision-making processes have been decided by the Court recently. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973). See also Shapiro, supra note 71, at 294; Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in
the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 523.
90. A strict application of democratic due process theory could seem to require overruling
of two recent Supreme Court cases. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Supreme
Court was confronted with the problem of terminating welfare benefits. A welfare recipient's
entitlement to benefit payments is generally defined and limited by a statute which provides for
termination of payments after a determination that the recipient is no longer eligible. The
statute does not require a hearing. Using a balancing approach, the Goldberg Court found that
the importance of welfare relief overcomes any countervailing state interest and that a hearing
must be available. Id. at 266. Under the democratic due process approach, the welfare recipient
would lose his property interest as soon as the agency completed the minimal procedural steps
required by statute. Since no property interest is created by state law, the due process clause is
never even activated. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 353 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), a suspended student asserted a constitutional right
to a pre-suspension hearing. Under the Bishop analysis, he is only entitled to whatever
statutory protection the state has provided for. As Justice Powell wrote in his Goss dissent,
"The very legislation which 'defines' the 'dimensions' of the students' entitlement, while
providing a right to education generally, does not establish this right free of discipline imposed
in accord with Ohio law." Id. at 565 (emphasis in original). The student, no less than the public
employee, must take the "bitter with the sweet." See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
The right to an education "is encompassed in the entire package of provisions governing
education. . . of which the power to suspend is one." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 465 (Powell,
J., dissenting). Bishop, with a little help from Paul v. Davis, has already seriously undermined
Goss without explicitly overruling it. Bishop itself would eviscerate any attempt to establish a
property interest in public education, for that interest would be contingent on whatever
disciplinary procedure the state decides to develop. Paul's devastating interpretation of Wis-
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democratic due process to a wider range of interests, it is precisely at this
juncture that it is most appropriate to subject the theory to rigorous critical
analysis.
II. DEMOCRATIC DUE PROCESS EXPOSED
A. The Return of the Right-Privilege Distinction
Although Bishop v. Wood marks a radical break with the recent past, it
is far from revolutionary when viewed against the background of the due
process jurisprudence of the last seventy-five years. Bishop represents a
return to a long-established constitutional doctrine-the right-privilege
distinction. 91
The doctrine traces its origins to the celebrated case of McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford.92 Police officer John McAuliffe was fired for
violating a regulation which forbade participation in political activity.
McAuliffe brought his suit on grounds hauntingly similar to Bishop's: he
argued first, that the relevant statute gave him a position from which he
could not be removed except for an act of bad behavior; second, that he did
not receive a "due hearing"; and third, that the notice and evidence were
irregular and insufficient. 93 Justice Holmes disposed of the claim with
cryptic dispatch, announcing that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 
94
Holmes' epigram became the classic statement of a simple but devas-
tating approach to government largess. 95 As to any interest which it has no
consin v. Constanineau, see note 61 supra, effectively finishes off whatever Bishop might have
left, for a student will no longer be able to assert a constitutionally protected interest in
reputation. Compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 574-75, with Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 701-10.
The Court in Paul does make a passing reference to Goss, id. at 710, but this should not be
misinterpreted as a signal that the students' reputation claim would still be viable. Justice
Rehnquist refuted the claim that reputation is a constitutionally rooted liberty interest by taking
Goss and every other case from which such a principle might be garnered and demonstrating
that it can be explained on alternate grounds. See id. at 701-10. Thus, he observes that while the
Goss Court noted that charges of misconduct could seriously damage a student's reputation, it
was also careful to point out that Ohio law conferred a "property" right upon all children to
attend school, and that suspension resulted in a denial of that right. Id. at 710. Under Justice
Rehnquist's analysis in Paul, then, injury to a liberty interest in reputation is cognizable only
when it is suffered in conjunction with deprivation of a distinct property interest. Of course,
after Bishop v. Wood, this careful distinction only serves to undermine Goss further, for no
property interest can exist beyond the dimensions created for it by state procedures.
91. This Comment is not the first place that the similarity between Bishop and the privilege
doctrine is noted. The point is made by Justice Brennan in his Bishop dissent, see 426 U.S. at
350. Significantly, several Justices made the same point in their discussions of Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion for the Arnett plurality. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 210-11 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
93. See id. at 220-21, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
94. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
95. See K. DAvis, supra note 6, § 7.12; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439-41 (1968).
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affirmative duty to provide-be it employment, education, welfare relief, a
license or a contract-the government could, as the "giver," attach any
conditions it pleased to the "gift.''96 Until relatively recent times, the
privilege doctrine stood as the stock response to procedural attacks on the
termination of public benefits. 97 Justice Rehnquist's trenchant remark that
public employees must take the "bitter with the sweet" is in perfect
consonance with the line of authority emanating from McAuliffe. To the
extent that Holmes' dictum has reached fruition in Bishop,98 the right-
privilege distinction must once again be confronted.
The distinction must be be confronted "once again" because in the
decade prior to Bishop it had generally been supposed that the privilege
doctrine was dead. 99 An impressive string of Supreme Court decisions
explicitly denounced the right-privilege distinction, 1°° and scholarly com-
ment fully supported the trend. 1°1 One cannot help but wonder how a
96. See Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 375, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (1941): "[I]n
accepting charity, the appellant has consented to the provisions of the law under which the
charity is bestowed."
97. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). The doctrine received one of its more celebrated applica-
tions in the appeal from the "Scopes Monkey Trial," Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 111, 289
S.W. 363, 364 (1927).
98. Some of the language in Bishop shows a strong resemblance to language in McAuliffe.
Compare, for example, Justice Stevens' statement that "the employee is merely given certain
procedural rights which the District Court found not to have been violated in this case," 341
U.S. at 347, with Holmes' statement in McAuliffe:
The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are
offered him. On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable condition
upon holding offices within its control.
155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 518.
99. E.g., W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS xv (5th
ed. 1970); Comment, The Due Process Clause and Dismissal from Government Employment, 2
HousToN L. REV. 120 (1964); Comment, Constitutional Rights of Public Employees-Progress
Toward Protection, 49 N.C. L. REV. 302 (1971); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional
Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
100. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
571 (1972); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,482 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627
n.6 (1969).
101. See note 99 supra.
In his leading article in this area, Professor Van Alstyne cites a series of cases founded on
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in support of his assertion that the right-privilege
dichotomy had been eviscerated. Van Alstyne, supra note 95, at 1446 nn.26-27. He is careful to
make it clear, however, that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by itself is not potent
enough to overthrow the right-privilege distinction. Id. 1447-49. He suggests an alternative
attack which, if applied, would effectively reach to the heart of the privilege doctrine and
destroy it from the inside. Id. at 1458-64. Had the courts adopted the jurisprudence suggested
by Professor Van Alstyne's approach the demise of the privilege doctrine would be a reality.
That jurisprudence, however, was grounded in the notion that a "right" was nothing more
than an ex post facto label attached to an interest which a court had deigned to protect. The
entitlement theory of Roth and Sindermann is diametrically at odds with Professor Van
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movement which had gained such vigorous and unanimous approval could
be so suddenly and summarily reversed. The answer is that the "death" of
the privilege doctrine was somewhat of a misnomer all along. What was
called the death of the right-privilege distinction was actually an over-
reading of two recent judicial trends: the increased use of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, and the tendency to recognize as legal rights
interests which had formerly been classified as privileges.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits the government
from conditioning the receipt of public benefits on the surrender of a
constitutional right. 102 It will defeat the privilege theory only in one limited
species of case, when a recognized constitutional right is clearly at stake.
The shortcomings of the doctrine are aptly demonstrated by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Elrod v. Burns.10 3 In Elrod, the Court held that
patronage workers could not be fired solely because of party affiliation. 104
Using an unconstitutional conditions approach, the Court ruled that such
dismissals violated the employees' first amendment rights of expression and
free association. 105 Even though the employees had no right to hold their
jobs, it was impermissible for the sheriff to condition continued employment
on espousal of his own political party affiliation.10 6 Consistent with Holmes'
epigram, the Elrod Court did not assert that the petitioners had a constitu-
tional right to be policemen; it simply emphasized that they did have a
Alstyne's approach. Once the entitlement theory gained acceptance, the "demise" of the
privilege doctrine was left to be effectuated by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
alone. As the article itself demonstrated, this state of things could only serve to make the
"demise" short-lived.
102. Thus, even though a state has no obligation to provide unemployment benefits, it
cannot administer such a program so as to refuse benefits to a person who will not work on
Saturday for religious reasons. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). But see Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (inspection of welfare homes). A state is under no constitutional
obligation to hire a teacher, but it may not condition his employment on surrender of first
amendment rights. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). A tenant may have no
right to public housing, but the Housing Authority cannot require certification as a "nonsubver-
sive" as a condition of continued occupancy. Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70
N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955). An early analysis of this area can be found in
Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 321 (1935).
103. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). The judgment of the Court was announced in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, in which Justices White and Marshall joined. Justice Brennan's opinion was a frontal
assault on the spoils system: it declared the entire practice of patronage employment uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 355-74. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote a short concurr-
ence in which he fully supported the Court's judgment but refused to join its "wide-ranging
opinion." Id. at 374.
104. The petitioners in Elrod were employees in the Sheriff's office of Cook County,
Illinois. Their jobs were not protected by any Illinois statute or ordinance; like Officer Bishop,
they could be fired at will. Id. at 349-51. The employees were Republicans who had been
appointed by a Republican sheriff. Following the election of a Democratic sheriff, they were
dismissed.




constitutional right to talk politics. Because Elrod did not question the
assertion that there is no constitutional right to public employment, the
employees scored a hollow victory. The finding that an unconstitutional
condition has been imposed may easily be avoided by a more astute sheriff
in the future. He need only take care not to explain why he fires his
subordinates, and fire with sufficient selectivity to prevent a court from
inferring that he was motivated solely by a desire to retailiate against those
who refused to surrender their constitutional rights. 107 In order to make use
of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the plaintiff must first estab-
lish a prima facie showing of unconstitutional purpose, 08 but the proof
required to make such a showing will nearly always be in the hands of the
very official whose conduct is the cause of the complaint.
This leads to a second important observation: the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions has absolutely no potency when, rather than alleging
that the government has discriminated, the complaint is simply that the
government was wrong. 10 9 Officer Bishop did not claim that he was fired
because he exercised a constitutional right. He argued simply that he did not
do what his superior said he did. As a practical matter, the vast majority of
plaintiffs who complain of insufficient or improper administrative procedure
will be complaining for the same reason that Bishop complained-they want
only a chance to present their side of the story and to have it fairly evaluated.
But the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions avails them nothing, for they
are not claiming a violation of any constitutional right." 10
The presumed death of the right-privilege distinction was based also on
the recent inclination of courts to give legal protection to interests which had
previously been labeled as mere privileges. This trend is more accurately
characterized as the creation of new rights. A right is nothing more than that
which the law protects.' As such, it must be distinguished from the many
107. Van Alstyne, supra note 95, at 1447.
108. The doctrine has sometimes failed even when a constitutional right ostensibly has been
violated. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
109. Van Alstyne, supra note 95, at 1447.
110. Something of the jurisprudential relationship between the two doctrines is revealed by
a Seventh Circuit decision of then Judge Stevens. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473
F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973). The Lewis case was brought by
non-civil service employees of the Illinois Secretary of State's office who were discharged from
their positions without explanation. Under state law, they could be fired at will. As in Elrod,
the dismissals occurred after a change in the party affiliation of the head of the governmental
department, this time the Secretary of State. The plaintiffs claimed they were fired because
they refused to become Republicans or to support the Republican party. Judge Stevens held
that if the allegations were true, the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970) for violation of their first amendment rights. 473 F.2d at 576. Foreshadowing his
opinion in Bishop, however, Judge Stevens was careful to point out that his ruling did not
provide employees with any job security as such. The federal courts, he made clear, do not sit
as a "super-civil service commission" to determine standards and procedures for employee
dismissals. Id. at 567-68. But see id. at 578 (Campbell, J., concurring).
111. See notes 119-20 infra and accompanying text.
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things which people value, but which are not legally protected.11 2 These
other things may be called "privileges," "gratuities" or simply "inter-
ests." 11 3 Whatever they are called, they embody nothing more than desires
and needs. Used in this sense, all people have interests in food, shelter,
employment and a good reputation." 4 But these interests do not rise to the
level of a right unless the law lends them protection. As the law began to
afford protection to such desires as public jobs, welfare benefits and drivers'
licenses, much of what was formerly "privilege" became elevated to
"right." It was mistaken, however, to suppose that the distinction between
rights and privileges itself had vanished, or that having lent protection to
certain desires, the courts could not later take that protection away." 5
In implicitly recognizing the continued vitality of the distinction be-
tween rights and privileges, Bishop is ultimately concerned with the two
questions which the application of the distinction will always pose: first,
from what body of law, if any, is the procedural protection for a given
interest derived; and, second, how much protection does that body of law
provide?
Constructive criticism of Bishop must focus on these two questions,
for no purpose is served by merely protesting that the right-privilege distinc-
tion has returned. To be preoccupied with the previously proclaimed death
of the distinction is to be drawn away from the genuinely significant issue.
The epigram of Holmes must be squarely faced: the analysis in Bishop must
stand unless one is prepared to argue that the due process clause does protect
Bishop's desire to retain his job-that the petitioner does have a constitu-
tional right to be a policeman." 6
B. The Jurisprudence of Federalism
The notion that a person may have a constitutional right to be a
policeman, or to receive a welfare check, or to possess a driver's license,
seems ludicrous in its very statement. None of these things is mentioned in
the Constitution, and no one can seriously suppose that he can walk into his
local precinct station and demand induction into the constabulary on "con-
stitutional grounds." Nothing so sweeping is meant by the phrase. Bishop
112. See K. DAvis, supra note 6, § 7.12.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. This analysis is consistent with that of Professor Van Alstyne who has argued that what
is labeled privilege and what is labeled right should turn on a normative inquiry into whether or
not the interest at stake ought to be protected. Van Alstyne, supra note 95, at 1459-64. Insofar
as such a normative analysis yields protection to an increased variety of interests, it is correct to
say that the set of interests collectively labeled "privileges" has been reduced. That is not to
say that it is an empty set, however, or that later, courts with different normative inclinations
would not reverse the trend and make the set expand once again.
116. Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 95, at 1458.
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sought only to establish that once he had become a policeman, the due
process clause had something to say about how that status could be altered.
Even this limited effort to establish a protective right, however, has a
suspicious aura. The suspicion springs from the tendency to think of rights
as pre-existing absolutes. Holmes claimed that rights have no a priori
existence: at the most, they are predictions of what a court will protect; 117 at
the least, they are nothing more than the reiteration of a court's holding. 118
The statement that someone has a "constitutional right to talk politics" is
only a prediction that a court will protect his desire to talk politics against
the efforts of the state to limit or restrain him. 119 If it seems like something
more than a prediction, that is only because experience has shown that its
accuracy approaches certainty. The "right" to talk politics is, to use
Holmes' own image, like the "law" of gravity: "[o]ne phrase adds no more
than the other to what we know without it." 12 0 It is merely an explanatory
label for a phenomenon confirmed in experience, not an immutable precept
transcending its physical manifestations.
This notion of a right as a prediction of what the law will protect
necessarily focuses attention on the problem of how the law develops.
Again, Holmes' jurisprudence provides a useful insight: logic is not the only
force at work in the development of the law. Ethical judgments are implicit
in every legal decision, 12 1 and these judgments will of course change with
time. As Holmes explained:
You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply
it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of
a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or in short, because of
some attitude of yours as a matter not capable of exact quantitative
measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical
conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds where the means do
not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time, and where
the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given
body in a given time and place. We do not realize how large a part of
our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of
the public mind. 22
Given this perspective, Holmes' epigram takes on yet another shade of
meaning. Constitutional rights have a temporal dimension. 23 In 1892, there
117. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897) ("The primary rights
and duties with which jurisprudence busies itself are nothing but prophecies").
118. Id.; Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918).
119. Van Alstyne, supra note 95, at 1460.
120. Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 118, at 42.
121. Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 117, at 465-66.
122. Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
123. See generally H. HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAW 97-120 (1961); Dahl, The Supreme Court




was no constitutional right to be a policeman. There was, in fact, only a frail
and somewhat hypothetical right to talk politics 124-certainly not the broad
right of free expression recognized today. 125 There was no judicially con-
firmed constitutional right to procreate,1 26 travel 127 or cast a proportionally
equal vote. 128 A right of privacy was, even in the common law, receiving
only sparing recognition. 129
The very assumption on which Bishop and democratic due process
theory rest-that a right in property or liberty is only that which the law
protects-furnishes the proof of Holmes' premise. Constitutional law pro-
tects much more in 1977 than it did in 1892. The legal rules extrapolated
from the Bill of Rights have changed, precisely as Holmes' theory said they
should. No matter how often the fourteenth amendment is read, its words
will not reveal whether the due process clause protects a person's desire to
be a policeman. The Court cannot decide what the due process clause
protects without deciding what it ought to protect.
The problem with democratic due process theory is that it purports to
decide what is protected and what is not without any inquiry at all into the
competing interests at stake in the controversy. It is a theory which appa-
rently leaves nothing to be decided. Judicial "judgment" is obviated. There
is no uncertainty, no element of prediction, no deliberation, no weighing of
relative interests. The formula is plugged in and the answer emerges.
But the certainty of Bishop's democratic due process analysis is illus-
ory. By itself, the democratic due process formula adds nothing to what we
know without it. The Court says that the due process clause protects only
constitutional rights. If a right is not constitutional in origin, the due process
clause affords protection for it only to the extent that the right is expressly
recognized and protected by state law. But this merely states a tautology. By
definition, if the due process clause protects an interest, it becomes a
constitutional right.
A glance backward at Roth and Sindermann reveals that the same
inverted logic was at work in those cases. Roth and Sindermann stand for
the proposition that to have a protected interest one must have an entitlement
to it, not a mere abstract expectation of its enjoyment. An entitlement,
124. The first case in which a claimant successfully invoked the protection of the first
amendment did not come until 1927, in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
125. Compare Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (Holmes, J.), with Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
126. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
127. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
128. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
129. The famous article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis appeared only two years
prior to McAuliffe. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See
also Robertson v. Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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however, is nothing more than a guarantee of protection. To say that one
must have an entitlement to an interest in order to gain legal protection for it
is simply to say that an interest must be protected if it is to gain protection.
The Court in essence proclaims that in order to have a "protected" interest,
one must have a "protected interest." To decide a case, however, a court
must go beyond definition: it must decide what ought to be protected.
As Holmes' theory suggests, the Supreme Court's decision in Bishop
implies a policy judgment that there should not be any constitutional right to
be a policeman. Despite its elaborate analytic superstructure, the democratic
due process approach is founded neither on pure reason nor on a foreor-
dained interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, but on considerations of
policy. And as it is based on policy grounds, it can be criticized on policy
grounds.
Justice Stevens' short, tersely worded opinion in Bishop still manages
to reveal a great deal about what motivated the Court to decide the case as it
did. The Bishop majority did not purport to decide that the petitioner's
desire to be a policeman deserved no protection; rather, the Justices decided
that the Court had no business making such decisions. 130 This broad judg-
ment can be distilled into several component parts, each of which reflects a
choice between competing interests. On the most abstract level, it is a
choice for popular sovereignty and against judicial intervention. A given
individual's desire to have certain interests placed beyond the risks of the
political process is held subordinate to the collective desire to make those
interests subject to the will of fifty-one percent of the people. The people,
after all, are the consumers of government largess-if it is not packaged in a
manner acceptable to them, they can "vote the rascals out" and have it
packaged differently. From the standpoint of government employment,
fairness becomes a function of market forces: the body politic grants its
employees such job security as it must in order to attract suitably qualified
employees into public service. Similarly, in dispensing charity, government
need only be as fair as the conscience or discretion of the majority dictates.
Further support for democratic due process is drawn from Brandeis'
notion that the states in a federal system should be laboratories for social and
political experimentation. 131 It is perfectly sensible to maintain, for exam-
ple, that the people of North Carolina should be allowed to establish law
enforcement jobs which have less "value" than comparable positions in
California. 132 Clearly, the Constitution does not contemplate that all states
must pay their police officers the same salaries, or set the same minimum
standards of education, or establish the same retirement age. 133 To accept
130. See 426 U.S. at 349-50.
131. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
132. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 229.
133. Indeed, the Court recently ruled that Congress has no authority to make federal
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the claim presented in Bishop v. Wood and hold that the Constitution
mandates uniformity in termination procedures or even minimum standards
of fairness would sharply restrict interstate diversity and local
sovereignty. 134
When viewed against the backdrop of the wide expanse of government
largess, these concerns multiply. If the Supreme Court sets procedural
protection for welfare benefits at "level A" and establishes less stringent
procedures for driver's license revocation at "level B," it imposes on the
states an important choice as to the relative worth of those interests. One can
argue strongly that the states ought to be free to make these relative
judgments individually, just as they are free to make differing determina-
tions concerning how much of their budgets will go to welfare or how
difficult they will make their driving examinations.
Finally, Bishop evidences a concern that state administrative decisions
are too numerous and complex to allow meaningful policing by the federal
courts. 135 The Court seems to feel not only that it has no basis for establish-
ing standards and safeguards, but that it could not enforce them effectively
even if it wanted to:
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agen-
cies. We must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes
are inevitable in the day-to-day administration of our affairs. The
United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to require
federal judicial review for every such error. In the absence of any claim
that the public employer was motivated by a desire to curtail or to
penalize the exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected
rights, we must presume that official action was regular and, if errone-
ous, can best be corrected in other ways. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or
ill-advised personnel decisions. 136
The felt strength of these policy considerations is further accentuated
by the peculiar mode of analysis which the Court employed to implement
minimum wage and maximum hour standards applicable to employees of state and local
governments. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 844-852 (1976).
134. The Bishop Court refused to accept this inconsistency. While sitting on the Seventh
Circuit, Judge Stevens was faced with a case somewhat similar to Bishop, involving the Illinois
Governor's decision to remove a liquor commissioner. The following excerpt from his opinion
reveals much about Bishop:
The question whether Adams had a property interest in his position as a member
of the Liquor Control Commission is, of course, purely a question of Illinois law. It is
not for us to appraise the wisdom of the State's choice between giving such a
Commissioner fixed tenure, on the one hand, or making his employment terminable
at the unfettered discretion of the Governor, on the other.
Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003, 1009 (7th Cir. 1974).
135. See 426 U.S. at 349-50.
136. Id. (citations omitted).
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them. It would have been far simpler to apply the traditional balancing
approach attaching sufficient weight to the government's interests to fore-
close a finding that additional procedures were required. Instead, the Court
chose to use a far more sweeping method of analysis. In ceding the
legislative branch effective control over the due process clause, the Court
did not simply reweight the elements in the balance; it circumvented use of
the balance altogether.
Even if the democratic and state-oriented policies behind the Bishop
decision are valid, they do not exist in a vacuum. Other longstanding
principles of constitutional law may restrict the extent to which those values
should be implemented. The Constitution has taken many decisions out of
the democratic process, and it has taken many areas of state authority and
made them at least partially subject to national control. 137 If the analysis of
democratic due process presented here correctly assesses the broader import
of that doctrine, then the Court has effectively ruled that such limitations no
longer apply to administrative procedure. It is that judgment to which the
final sections of this Comment will address itself, examining the principles
of equal protection and separation of powers to see if they are inconsistent
with plenary legislative control over the contours of administrative due
process. If such an inconsistency does exist, then there must be at least a
limited constitutional right to be a policeman.
C. Equal Protection as a Source of Procedural Due Process
The democratic due process theory rests on what might be called the
"defining power" of the states. Because the Court leaves the states the
power to define what liberty and property interests are, the states acquire
effective control over the scope of due process itself. But one unexplored
assumption in the theory of democratic due process is that the definition and
protection of property and liberty interests must come either from the state
alone or from the Constitution alone.1 3 The Court never considers the
possibility that an interest may draw protection from both sources
simultaneously. 139
It is perfectly possible, however, for an interest to draw protection from
both state law and the Constitution. There are many areas of law in which
both the states and the federal government have mutually limited spheres of
influence. It does not follow that because the states have the initial power to
bring a particular interest into existence, they have plenary power to fix the
137. See note 140 infra and accompanying text.
138. Tushnet, supra note 20, at 268-70.
139. In Paul v. Davis, for example, the Court first decided whether an interest in reputation
receives constitutional protection. See 424 U.S. at 701-10. After holding that it did not, it moves
on to a totally separate analysis of whether reputation is a protected liberty or property interest
under Kentucky law. See id. at 711-12.
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limits of that interest. 1" The Constitution may act as an external check on
the use of a power, even though it is wholly up to the state, in the first
instance, to decide whether it will first exercise the power at all. 141
The paramount example of such an external check is the equal protec-
tion clause. 142 A state is not required to provide appellate review of trial
court decisions, or even to establish appellate courts at all. 143 The initial
decision whether to create a right of appeal is left completely to the states'
discretion. 1 But once this power is exercised, there are constitutional limits
on the manner in which it is wielded. Griffin v. Illinois1 45 held that states
may not limit the right to appellate review in such a way as to discriminate
against those who are too poor to pay for a trial transcript. 146 Similarly, no
140. The cases which have interpreted the "taking clause" of the fifth amendment present
the classic example of an external restraint on the states' otherwise uninhibited police power.
See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The cases provide an interesting foil for the procedural due
process cases dealt with here, for they too are concerned with the extent to which private
property interests can be taken away by government action which does not comport with
constitutionally required procedure. Insofar as any given "taking" is labeled an "exercise of
the police power," it is not a "taking" in the constitutional sense, and the fifth amendment no
longer applies to it. The label which is attached to the transaction becomes determinative. If it is
characterized as a "taking," the fifth amendment's strictures on condemnation procedure and
just compensation must be adhered to. If it is characterized as an exercise of the police power,
the government's action will be unimpaired. This mechanical jurisprudence resembles the same
sort of either/or labeling which has plagued the entitlement theory. The dangers of this sort of
superficial judicial rationalization once prompted Justice Holmes to speak of the "petty larceny
of the police power." I Holmes-Laski Letters 456-57 (Howe ed. 1953). In a less cryptic
analysis, Holmes, in the famouse case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
seemed to be insisting that the definition of "property" as it is used in the federal constitution
can never be made by reference to the states' police power, for if the "police power" is to
control the definition of what is and what is not "property," then the constitutionally guaran-
teed institution of property will not longer exist:
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is
wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without just
compensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . . When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified
by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualifica-
tion more and more until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be
accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 415. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Right, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150-51 (1971);
see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61-76 (1964). See generally Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
141. This is a distillation of Justice White's position in Arnett v. Kennedy. In his separate
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice White argued that although states may
define property, the Constitution alone defines the requisites of due process. 416 U.S. at 185.
See note 45 supra.
142. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV § 1.
143. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894).
144. Id.
145. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
146. Id. at 19.
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state is required to furnish its children with a public education. 147 If a school
system is established, however, Brown v. Board of Education'48 and its
progeny dictate much about how the system must be organized. 149
The problem with these examples is that they serve only to demonstrate
the force of the equal protection clause in situations where a specific
constitutional violation has already occurred. They do not establish a
prophylactic right to procedural protection-a right designed to prevent
violations from occurring. To be of any help to a litigant such as Bishop,
who claims to have been fired not because of race or financial status but
because of arbitrariness, the equal protection clause must be construed as a
source of some procedure protection. An arbitrary act is not the same thing
as a discriminatory act. For equal protection purposes, a discriminatory act
is an act committed for an impermissible reason. An arbitrary act is capri-
cious. It is, in effect, committed for no reason at all.150 Even the most
lenient standard of judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause re-
quires that government action have some rational basis. 151 At the very least,
government must have a reason for what it does to a person.152
Bishop v. Wood, however, seems to proceed on the belief that a city
can fire its policemen for no reason at all. In addition to being the logical
terminus of the Bishop rationale, 153 this belief is given clear expression in
the opinion itself. According to Justice Stevens, Officer Bishop held his job
at the "will and pleasure of the city."' 5 4 The obvious question is whether an
147. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1973).
148. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
149. But cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
150. See generally Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALF. L.
REV. 341 (1949).
151. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
152. In Rabin, Job Security and Due rocess: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through
a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CH L. REV. 60 (1976), a very similar attack on Bishop is made,
by arguing that administrators should always be compelled to state the reasons for their actions.
Id. at 74-80. Professor Rabin notes that due to the mechanical either/or jurisprudence which has
characterized entitlement theory since Roth, undue attention has been focused on full dress
evidentiary hearings. Thus, when such hearings were balked at by the Court, the tendency was
to throw out all other procedural protection with them. Lower thresholds of due process,
particulary a simple requirement of a reasoned explanation, should be maintained even when a
full dress hearing is overly burdensome. Id. at 87. A major problem with Bishop, of course, is
that it leaves no room for his kind of flexibility.
153. Because the state can set whatever procedural safeguards it pleases, it is free to
establish no procedural safeguards at all. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
154. 426 U.S. at 345. The recent case of Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct.
568 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.) confirms that the Court does in fact hold to the premise that public
employees may be fired for "no reason whatever." Id. at 574. The case involved a school
teacher who was not rehired. A letter from the school superintendent stated that the decision
was made for two reasons. First, the teacher had called a local radio station to read on the air a
memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance. Second, the teacher allegedly made
obscene gestures to students in the process of quelling a disturbance in the school cafeteria. The
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action taken in pursuit of the city's "will and pleasure" contravenes the
requirement that the city's action be rationally based.
In answering this question, it is useful to begin by positing that
employment "at will" is employment in which the employee can be fired at
any time. If he can be fired at any time, however, then he must also be
dismissable without "cause" or "reason." If the employer had to wait for a
reason to arise before dismissing an employee, then by definition the
employee could not be fired at any time. But to say that the employer may
fire the employee "without reason" does not mean that the employer
literally need have no reason at all; it must be assumed that some reason will
always exist for the dismissal of an employee. The "reason" may be
nothing more than the employer's indigestion; but if the word is used
synonymously with "cause," a reason will always exist. Reflection reveals
that the statement that the employer "does not need a reason" means that
the employer does not need to state what his reasons are.
The next question is why a government employer would wish not to
state its reasons for firing an employee. It can only be because it knows that
its reasons are not permissible. 155 If Bishop was truly fired for reasons
relevant to his performance as a police officer, the state would have had
nothing to lose in stating what those reasons were. But if the real cause of
Bishop's dismissal was his race, his religion, or the police chief's indiges-
tion, the state would truly have been handicapped by disclosure. 156 "[I]t is
not burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist. . . . It is only where
the government acts improperly that procedural due process is truly burden-
some." 5 7 The only government "interest" served by allowing the state to
fire employees at its "will and pleasure" is the preservation of license
to act arbitrarily.
Court read Roth for the proposition that when state law does not require "cause" or "reason"
for dismissal, the state is under no constitutional duty to explain its actions. Id. at 575. The
Doyle case also narrows even further the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. For although
the petitioner could plainly point to the fact that he was fired in part because he exercised a
protected first amendment right, id. at 574, the Court held that he should not be reinstated if the
school board would have fired him anyway.
The rub, of course, is that the Court had already stated that Doyle could have been fired for
"no reason whatever." Id. If he could have been fired for "no reason," how can the petitioner
prove that he would not have been fired but for his exercise of first amendment rights? The
district court attempted to resolve this problem by ruling that Doyle should be reinstated if his
protected conduct played a "substantial part" in the decision. Id. at 574-75. The Supreme
Court rejected this approach, however, and ruled that Doyle should not be reinstated unless he
could show that his conduct was a "motivating factor" in the decision. Id. at 576.
155. Considerations of cost and efficiency do not arise at this hypothetical juncture, for all
that is required is a simple statement of the reasons for dismissal.
156. Such disclosure would subject the state to suit along the lines of Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347 (1976), see notes 103-06 supra and accompanying text.
157. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 591 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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So far, this analysis of procedure as a function of equal protection has
centered on the prevention of impermissible government action. There is a
broader aspect to equal protection, however, which is embodied in the
notion that government action must not only be permissible, it must also be
consistent. It is a basic tenet of equal protection that persons similarly
situated must be similarly treated.'58 If, as far as they can be measured, the
performances of police officers Adams and Baker are identical, the equal
protection clause requires that they receive identical treatment. If they are to
receive different treatment the burden should be on the government to
demonstrate how they are different. If the police chief is free to fire Adams
and retain Baker, and is obliged to tell Adams nothing more than "You're
fired but I'm not going to tell you why," the value of consistency is lost and
equal protection is rendered illusory. 159
The requirements of rationality and consistency lead to another much
thornier problem. Although it may safely be supposed that the equal protec-
tion clause does require the minimum procedural step of informing in-
terested parties of the reasons behind government action, it is far from clear
what is required beyond that minimum. Burdens begin to accumulate if the
police chief is required to state his reasons seven days in advance of his
action, if he must defend the veracity of statements with evidence of some
kind, or if he must allow the officer to attack the evidence and offer
evidence of his own. Each of these steps will surely be demanded, and once
one is admitted, the others seem inexorably to follow. The arguments for the
complainant are obvious. What good is an official explanation if there is no
opportunity to challenge the truthfulness of the explanation or the accuracy
of its supporting facts? What good is the right to challenge the explanation
without sufficient time to prepare the challenge? And what good is time to
prepare without a proper forum in which to present the case?
Pressure for more elaborate safeguards is not the only product of the
initial recognition of procedural rights. The instant a court denies govern-
ment the power to act without an explanation, it has put itself in a position
where it cannot avoid imposing substantive administrative standards. The
requirement for an explanation of official action ineluctably leads to a
second requirement that the explanation given be sufficient to justify the
action taken. When a court says that turbulence in the police chief's
digestive tract is not enough to justify firing a subordinate, it automatically
begins to write a common law of public employment standards. In deciding
what is irrelevant to the decision whether to hire or fire a government
158. Tussman & TenBroek, supra note 150, at 344.
159. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1967): "[W]hat is justice in any particular
case may not be determined by considering only the one case but must be determined in the
light of what is done in comparable cases. If equality of treatment is one ingredient of justice,
one cannot know whether penalizing B is just without looking at A's case-and C's and D's."
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worker, the court simultaneously narrows the government's choice as to
what is relevant. If the police chief fires officer Adams but retains Baker,
and explains his action by saying that Adams' hair was too long, the court
cannot decide the case without deciding whether hair length is a legitimate
criterion on which to base termination actions. 160 Whichever way it rules, it
creates substantive law which binds the employment relationship. 161
Thus, anything beyond a simple requirement that reasons be stated
produces two corollary effects. First, the Court must determine how much
procedural protection a given interest deserves; then it must decide what
substantive considerations are relevant to administrative decision affecting
that interest. The burdens imposed by use of this approach are offset by the
fact that each additional procedural requirement strengthens the equal pro-
tection clause by making arbitrary and discriminatory action easier to detect.
No claim is made that the balance is easy to strike, but a decision should not
be avoided because it is difficult. The equal protection clause is a limitation
on the power of the states, and the Court must supply substance to that
limitation. Although the Court may legitimately choose to set the level of
limitation very low, it may not legitimately choose to avoid setting the level
at all. To the extent that it attempted such avoidance, Bishop cannot be
defended. By concentrating on the definition which individual interests are
given by state law, the Court has elevated form over substance and has
shunted aside the balancing of interests which is essential to principled equal
protection analysis.
D. Due Process and the Separation of Powers
The equal protection clause is not the sole constitutional restraint on the
power of state and federal legislatures to define the boundaries of liberty and
property. A second and perhaps more compelling limitation is supplied by
the concept of the separation of powers. If its future decisions give ever
wider application to democratic due process theory, the Court will effective-
ly have renounced (at least in part) one of the paramount responsibilities of
the judiciary under our system of government-the duty to check excesses
of the majority when they become embodied in legislative enactments. The
first impulse of the men who set out to frame our constitutional government
of limited powers was not to draw a document enumerating certain individu-
160. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244-49 (1976), in which the Supreme Court found
itself confronted with precisely this dilemma:
Neither this Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the District Court is in a position to
weigh the policy arguments in favor of and against a rule regulating hairstyles. ...
The constitutional issue to be decided by these courts is whether petitioner's determi-




161. Comment, supra note 42, at 103-07.
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al rights, but to draw a document that fractionalized the structure of
government itself.162 Instead of focusing on the prerogatives individuals
were to retain, the framers concentrated on the power government was to be
given and how that power was to be allocated. A central component of their
design was the concept of separation of powers.
The size and influence of administrative agencies have made govern-
mental power far more potent and pervasive in 1977 than it was in 1789.163
At the same time, the burgeoning complexities of modem technological
society have necessitated the creation of agencies with highly concentrated
power and combined legislative, executive and judicial functions. 164 For the
most part, courts have been content to overlook classical notions of separa-
tion of powers and approve both the magnitude and structure of administra-
tive power, intervening only when that power is used to transgress a specific
constitutional right. 165 It has therefore become customary to think of checks
on administrative power only in terms of the interface between that power
and individual rights.
A revisit to the doctrine of separation of powers reveals, however, that
it retains much of its original vitality, and that it is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the theory of democratic due process. The doctrine is based on
shrewd insights into human nature and political reality which, if anything,
have more relevance now than in 1789. Two assertions concerning the
doctrine of separation of powers are crucial: first, that it is anchored in an
independent and active judicial branch; and second, that judicial supervision
over procedure is the sine qua non of that independence and activism.
It should never be forgotten that at the heart of the constitutional
division of power there lies a profound pessimism about the inclinations of
people who govern. Madison, for all his egalitarianism, was unwilling to
put the preservation of liberties in the hands of the democratic process
alone. 1  As he said in writing to Jefferson, "Wherever the real power lies,
162. James Madison, for example, did not initially focus his energies on adoption of a bill of
rights, see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269 (G. Hunt ed. 1904), but on governmental organization. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (J. Madison).
163. See Reich, supra note 2, at 733-39.
164. B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 29-30 (1972).
165. W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 43 (1941).
166. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison). This pessimism has never been expressed more
clearly than in Madison's THE FEDERALIST No. 51:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people, is no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions.
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there is the danger of oppression . . . . Wherever there is an interest and
power to do wrong, wrong will generally be done, and no less readily by a
powerful and interested party than by a powerful and interested prince." 
167
Jefferson wrote to Madison in response that the most effective way to
hold governmental power in check was through a strong and independent
judiciary. 168 This faith in an independent judiciary greatly influenced Madi-
son, 169 and it became a pervasive theme among other defenders of the
Constitution, including Alexander Hamilton:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I under-
stand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative
authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder,
no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be
preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts
of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reserva-
tions of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
170
Hamilton was not afraid to concentrate great power in the executive and
legislative branches of government so long as the courts retained their
independence as a check on that power. The question which must be asked
about the democratic due process theory is clear: has it attempted to retain
the first half of Hamilton's political design-the concentration of extensive
power in government-without heeding his warning that strong administra-
tive power must be checked by strong judicial supervision?
The answer to this question should begin with the notation that as the
realm of administrative power has expanded, courts, administrators and
scholars alike have continually emphasized the importance of a correspond-
ing growth in administrative procedure. 171 This emphasis has not been
articulated in terms of any individual's right to procedure; rather, it has been
expressed as concern over what kind of posture a government in a free
society should take in its dealings with citizens. Great pressures exist to
make modern government as large, but also as efficient and flexible, as
possible. Yet it has long been recognized that these elements in com-
bination-enormous size, a desire for efficiency, and structural flexibility-
are precisely the elements that lead to the arbitrary abuse of power. The
development of administrative law has therefore been characterized not by
167. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 5 WRrr-
INGS OF MADISON, supra note 162, at 272-73.
168. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (March 15, 1789), reprinted in 14 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659 (1958).
169. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789).
170. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
171. Williams, Fifty Years of the Law of the Federal Administrative Agencies and Beyond,
29 FED. BAR J. 267, 267-77 (1970).
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anxiety about the existence of administrative power itself, but about the
controls which exist to contain that power.
Only two Supreme Court cases in seventy years have invalidated the
transfer of power to an agency. 172 It is telling that in one of them, the
Schechter Poultry case, Chief Justice Hughes would heavily emphasize the
absence of procedural safeguards.1 73 Although the non-delegation doctrine
has been largely dormant since Schechter,174 Chief Justice Hughes' concern
over administrative procedure has proven to be one of the most important
continuing issues in administrative law. There has in fact been a comprom-
ise in constitutional theory. 175 In return for a relaxed interpretation of the
non-delegation doctrine, the courts have exacted more demanding proce-
dural safeguards. 176 The focus of the courts should no longer be on stan-
dards; it should be on the "totality of protection against arbitrariness." 177
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that efficiency, flexi-
bility, and strength have never been the dominant values under the constitu-
tional scheme. The imposition of procedural restraints and the fractionaliza-
tion of power are both inherently non-utilitarian. As Chief Justice Warren
once noted, the separation of powers "was obviously not instituted with the
idea that it would promote governmental efficiency." 178 By forcing govern-
ment to work against itself, the separation of powers doctrine sacrifices
more efficient administration to the overriding objective of fair
administration.
The theory of democratic due process cannot be reconciled with these
long-standing principles. It violates both the classic doctrine of a separation
of powers, which is grounded in an independent judiciary, and its modern
variant, grounded in external procedural safeguards. Analysis of "individu-
al rights" aside, democratic due process permits exactly what the separation
doctrine is meant to forbid: one branch of government is allowed to decide
for itself what stance it will take in relation to the individual. Enormous
power is wielded by those who control the disbursement of government
largess. If that power is fractionalized so that an independent judiciary
172. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
173. See 295 U.S. at 533.
174. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-40.(1976).
175. See Nutting, Congressional Delegations Since the Schechter Case, 14 Miss. L.J. 350,
366-67 (1942).
176. This movement has been spearheaded by the efforts of Professor Davis, who has
repeatedly called for a revitalized non-delegation doctrine in which the primary emphasis is on
procedural protection. Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 726
(1969).
177. K. DAVIS, supra note 6, § 2.10 at 52.




stands ready to ensure its administration in accordance with effective pro-
cedural safeguards, there is adequate protection against the arbitrary exer-
cise of that power. If, however, the power is concentrated and unfettered by
such an external restraint, it is bound to lead to the very abuses which the
constitutional convention was determined to prevent.
Recent history confirms that human nature and its reaction to power
have undergone little change since 1789. What has changed is the opportun-
ity for the darker side of that nature to work abuses on the everyday lives of
citizens. As miniscule as the role of government was in 1789, the framers
nonetheless sought to envelop it in an elaborate system of checks and
balances, and to supplement that system with a Bill of Rights composed
largely of procedural safeguards. It is difficult to understand how
those devices can justifiably be abandoned at the very moment in history
when governmental power is at its apex. If they are abandoned, whether in
the name of efficiency or democracy, the price will be great. Undivided
against itself, government will move more quickly, and there will be less
procedure to encumber it, but arbitrary and discriminatory action must
necessarily increase. 79 As Justice Douglas once observed, it is no accident
"that most of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is procedure that marks
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat." ' 180
III. CONCLUSION
The analysis employed by the Court in the unassuming case of Bishop
v. Wood is deceptively simple: to invoke the due process clause one must
have a protected interest at stake; to have a protected interest one must have
an entitlement under state law; the dimensions of that entitlement are
measured by the procedures which the state establishes to guard the interest.
Application of the analysis, however, produces powerful and undesirable
results. Constitutional inquiry is vitiated under Bishop, and procedural
protection becomes totally a function of statutory grant.
It is unclear at present whether the Court is willing to extend democra-
tic due process analysis beyond the field of public employment.",'
Nevertheless, the democratic due process doctrine possesses an inherent
expansiveness. It is predicated on the unbridled power of the states to define
the concepts "liberty" and "property," and those concepts are broad
enough to encompass a wide variety of government largess. Equally sus-
ceptible of broader application is the Bishop Court's announcement that the
federal judiciary is not the forum in which the countless daily decisions of
local administrators are to be scrutinized.
179. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
180. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
181. See notes 78-85 supra and accompanying text.
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In the very expansiveness of the doctrine, however, lie its most basic
deficiencies. Because it is grounded in the technical definitions given to
"property" and "liberty" by the states, it exalts form over substance.
Bishop is an attempt to justify a choice between competing interests without
really addressing the relative importance of those interests. Furthermore,
because the logical extension of the doctrine would permit the states to
withhold procedural protections altogether, it invites arbitrary administra-
tive action in contravention of the equal protection clause. By granting
supervision of procedural rights to the legislatures and by countenancing the
unsupervised delegation of executive, legislative and judicial functions to
one entity, the doctrine emasculates the concept of fractionalized, limited
power. Democratic due process takes a well-developed judicial concept,
historically utilized as a check on legislative and executive power, and
transforms it into a powerful tool for the exercise of those powers unbridled
by meaningful procedural restraints. In the context of government largess,
the Court may well have read the due process clause out of the Constitution,
relegating it to a fate similar to that visited upon the man in Stephen Crane's
poem:
A man said to the universe,
"Sir, I exist!"
"However," replied the universe,
"The fact has not created in me
A sense of obligation.' 18 2
182. THE PORTABLE STEPHEN CRANE 548 (J. Katz ed. 1969).
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